90 Allow Post-Delivery Transfers of Cooperative Quota in the Central GOA Rockfish Pilot Program and Amendment 80 Program
Purpose and Need
When the Amendment 80 Program and the Central GOA Rockfish Pilot Program were established, NMFS issued quota share (QS) to individual vessels based on their historic participation in the fishery. QS holders could then either join cooperatives with other QS holders or participate in a limited access fishery with other non-cooperative QS holders. If QS holders opt to form a cooperative, a cooperative quota (CQ) is issued by NMFS based on the relative amount of QS held by members compared to the total QS pool. The CQ serves as a permit that provides exclusive harvesting privileges for a specific amount of groundfish. Excess harvest of the CQ allocation is a regulatory violation and is punishable by confiscation of catch and other penalties. Concerns were expressed that a portion of the CQ went unharvested due to the risk of overages and associated penalties. Though strict overage penalties were in place, the fleet was relatively inflexible in how they could handle quota transfers, and therefore opted to forego harvesting a portion of their quota to avoid the risk of incurring the penalties associated with excess harvest. Under both Amendment 80 and the Central GOA Rockfish Pilot Program, cooperatives could transfer unused CQ to other cooperatives but were subject to NMFS approval before they were effective; postdelivery transfers – a transfer of CQ after delivery to rectify a negative CQ balance – were not permitted. In a purpose and need statement, the Council identified the need to allow postdelivery transfers of CQ to reduce the number of violations and encourage a more complete harvest of the quota without the risk of overharvesting allocations.
Analysis
Both RIRs, prepared for the amendments, analyzed two action alternatives and a status quo alternative. Both action alternatives involved the allowance of postdelivery transfers, but at different amounts. Alternative 2 (the Council’s preferred alternative) allowed for unlimited postdelivery transfers, while Alternative 3 provided moderately limited post-delivery transfers. Under Alternative 3, the strictly limited transfer of PSC were likely sufficient to cover an unintentional overage arising from a single tow, but could reduce the effectiveness of the provision in addressing harvesting efficiencies that could be realized through in-season transfers used to coordinate harvesting activity that could not be completed in a timely manner.
Regulation Summary
Amendment 78 to the GOA FMP and Amendment 90 to the BSAI FMP added the language to the respective FMP to allow for the transfer of CQ after a delivery to cover any potential overages given that the cooperative account had a zero or positive balance before the start of the trip.
Results
Both actions were instrumental in allowing unlimited post-delivery transfers within the cooperatives. In June 2010, the Council took final action defining a catch share program for the Central GOA directed rockfish fisheries. The program was intended to replace the pilot program since that program expired at the end of the 2011 season. As part of the new Central GOA Rockfish Program, post-delivery transfers of cooperative quota where authorized.